Guest Post: The Case for Strategic Autonomy in the UK and Europe
How the investment community can respond and support, and help overcome today's challenges, by Hugo Jammes, Founding Partner, EDT Ventures
Over the past decade, the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ has emerged as a central theme in United Kingdom and European discourse, shaping debates in foreign policy, security, economics, and technology. At its core, strategic autonomy refers to our ambition and ability to act independently in support of our economic and national security. It has become an imperative for the UK and Europe, but it faces challenges.
What strategic autonomy means and how the investment community can contribute to it is a question I have grappled with over the last decade. My approach is informed by my own experience, first as a soldier and more recently, my work at the intersection of government, entrepreneurs and capital providers.
The Context
The shifting contours of geopolitics – marked by resurgent great power competition, regional conflicts, and emerging technological threats – have placed unparalleled pressure on the defence, security and resilience of the UK and Europe.
The ongoing war in Ukraine, the persistent threat from hostile states, and the rapid evolution of dual-use technology have exposed an uncomfortable truth: we are in a technology race that underpins our national and economic security and defence.
For the investment community, strategic autonomy presents both opportunity and risk. Understanding and then adapting to this new context is a critical task facing investors. To succeed, it will take commitment, trust, deep expertise, expansive networks and high ambition to drive both impact and value.
The Changing Geopolitical Landscape
Europe’s traditional security and economic umbrella has long rested with the United States. Since World War II, the transatlantic alliance, embodied in NATO and strengthened through economic partnership, has provided Europe with a sense of stability and protection – the so-called ‘peace dividend’. However, the rise of new spheres of power, most notably China and a resurgent Russia, has complicated the global order.
The potential for policy shifts in Allied and non-Allied countries underscores the risks of dependency. Simultaneously, the conflict in Ukraine and increasingly sophisticated hybrid threats in the digital domain have highlighted the limitations of our current deterrence posture. China’s rapid technological advancements and assertive foreign policy further complicate this picture, especially in areas such as critical infrastructure, digital networks, and supply chains.
The Economic Imperative
Strategic autonomy is not merely about defence; it encompasses economic resilience and the capacity to safeguard the UK and Europe’s interests in a volatile global economy. Much of the public rhetoric today, echoing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘New Dealers’ policy work, is focused on laying the foundations for a broader vision of national security that extends beyond purely military defence and sets the conditions for the continued growth of the European continent. Political leaders emphasise collective security, economic stability, and rule-of-law institutions as central pillars of a resilient Europe.
Readers need not be reminded of the lessons learnt during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the continent’s dependence on global supply chains, especially for vital goods such as medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors, was exposed. Trade disruptions and a rise in protectionism and economic nationalism worldwide underscored the fragility of a system where the UK and Europe do not control their own critical inputs.
Moreover, foreign investment in strategic sectors (e.g. telecoms, energy, and transportation) creates risks of technological leakage, foreign influence, and economic coercion.
Consider the case for European venture. Research by Dealroom highlighted that non-European investors accounted for 47% of total funding in 2024, and US investors contributed 35% of the European growth funding pool.
Whilst this clearly signifies the attractiveness of Europe as an investment geography, it also poses serious questions on how the UK and Europe are to reduce their reliance on foreign capital and nurture the talent, IP and ecosystem so essential in a competitive world.
The European Chips Act and the UK’s National Security Investment Act (NSIA) are two examples of how governments are taking steps to reduce that reliance, underscoring how economic autonomy is inseparable from strategic security.
Technology as a Strategic Battleground
The twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of technology as a new domain of geopolitical competition.
Digital infrastructure, data governance, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity are not only economic assets but also sources of strategic leverage. The UK and Europe’s vulnerability in this domain is manifest in their dependence on foreign (predominantly American and Chinese) technology platforms and cloud providers. The risk of technological “weaponisation” – using technology for economic coercion or espionage – makes the pursuit of technological sovereignty a critical component of strategic autonomy.
There is a clear need to rebuild not only our ability to deter adversaries militarily but also ensure the right environment for the full spectrum of “enablers.” This can range from propellants to microchips, artificial intelligence to heavy industry, and includes a thriving, skilled workforce.
Achieving true autonomy will require investment, innovation, and coordinated industrial policy across member states. Sovereign and multi-lateral programmes across Europe such as NSSIF, the NATO Innovation Fund, Estonia’s SmartCap Defence Fund and other sovereign or multi-lateral programmes across Europe all have a role to play.
While NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic defence, the war in Ukraine has catalysed discussions about the necessity for greater UK and European defence spending, joint procurement, and the development of rapid deployment forces. We are now entering an era where widespread industrial transformation is required to assure our collective security.
Challenges to Achieving Strategic Autonomy
The logic for strategic autonomy is obvious, but its realisation faces significant obstacles.
Chief among these is the diversity of interests, threat perceptions, and strategic cultures among UK and EU member states.
Budgetary constraints and the complexities of joint decision-making further hamper progress, with the EU’s institutional architecture (which often requires consensus among member states on foreign and security matters) running the risk of gridlock.
Industrial competition between European firms, national defence procurement practices, and divergent technological priorities also impede the development of unified capabilities.
Moreover, strategic autonomy is sometimes misunderstood as synonymous with isolationism or decoupling. My experience at NSSIF, and in the military, has taught me that strategic autonomy entails building the capacity to choose: you act with partners when possible and alone when necessary. Communicating this vision, both within Europe and to its international partners, is critical for its acceptance and success.
The Path Forward
Achieving strategic autonomy will not happen overnight. It relies on pragmatic, incremental steps rather than grand political soundbites.
Areas where collective action offers clear added value are already being prioritised, such as joint procurement of defence equipment, harmonising standards, creating common reserves for critical supplies and fostering innovation networks to bolster resilience.
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework and the EU SAFE Agreement (Security Action for Europe), for example, represent significant steps toward greater defence integration, enabling joint projects, shared capabilities, and more efficient use of resources.
True strategic autonomy, however, will require not only political will and financial investment but also a shared strategic culture.
For investors, supporting the growth and scaling of strategic technologies is where they can have the most impact, whilst also delivering the returns their own investors require.
My previous position, as Head of Investment for NSSIF, was focused on helping the UK ‘out-innovate’ the adversary and accelerating the ability of the national security and defence communities to access and integrate advanced technologies.
Input from national security and defence colleagues clearly articulated a consensus about the required advancements in a range of technologies across the technological stack.
However, when everything is a priority, nothing is. It is clear that the critical capabilities we will need to compete economically and militarily are rooted in dual-use innovations (technologies with both civilian and national security or defence relevance). These include novel sensing capabilities and the ability to process ever-greater volumes of data to make decisions and task assets.
Dual-use technologies can not only provide a decisive advantage on the battlefield but also catalyse economic growth.
NATO has already been explicit in what it wishes to achieve in this regard.
Investment in AI, autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotech, space, novel materials and other emerging disruptive technologies is paramount.
This is largely mirrored in the UK by the Strategic Defence Review and broadly reflects the investment priorities of NSSIF and the NATO Innovation Fund.
With that being said, no one would deny that rebuilding conventional defence capabilities and stockpiles is of equal importance – indeed, it is essential.
But there is a key distinction between what might be a suitable venture investment and what could be better supported by other forms of private equity or public funding. Many of the core defence capabilities we require can be characterised by limited government-only markets, complex regulatory burdens and constrained exit pathways. Dual-use technologies offer large addressable markets, moderate regulatory burdens (at least initially) and can exploit rapid innovation cycles that generate greater growth.
They also typically have a much broader range of exit options and a wider pool of capital from which to access. Examples of investments I have made previously reinforce this point – they include Tekever, Riverlane, Photonic, and Foundries.io – are all companies with obvious civil applications as well as real applications inside national security and defence.
Governments across the continent have recognised that investing in dual-use technology accelerates innovation across various sectors, creating new opportunities for growth and development, and building capacity to deter aggression, as well as mitigating strategic ‘surprise’.
Our strategic autonomy depends on supporting and scaling critical technologies and our ability to translate these companies into high-growth international businesses. This is where financial investors can make a real difference.
Hugo Jammes is the Founding Partner of EDT Ventures. He was previously Managing Partner and Head of Investment at the UK’s National Security Strategic Investment Fund (NSSIF). Hugo started his career in the British Army before moving into financial services.
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