The role of Ukrainian civil society in the security and defence sector
An important report into defence NGOs in Ukraine is essential reading for anyone working in defence tech. Here is a summary from its authors.
The Sahaidachnyi Security Center, a Kyiv-based think tank in security and defence, has produced an important report on the key NGOs playing a leading role in the defence of Ukraine. The role of non-governmental agencies in Ukraine has evolved rapidly during the war and they now fulfil functions normally associated with the government or military. To understand Ukraine’s defence tech sector, it is essential to know about these NGOs. This summary has been written for Resilience Media by the report’s authors. You can read the full report here.
The role of Ukrainian civil society in the security and defence sector is often underestimated. However, as in other areas of public policy, civil society has consistently acted as a driver of change—frequently stepping in to perform functions traditionally associated with the state. Since the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2014, and especially following the full-scale invasion in 2022, numerous charities, NGOs, and think tanks have emerged to support the country’s defence efforts.
The briefing document highlights several cases that illustrate how Ukrainian non-governmental organisations are actively contributing to both frontline support and broader national defence and argues that international financing and cooperation should be significantly increased.
Traditional development assistance has largely avoided security-related support due to longstanding taboos. The UK stands out as the only country that has systematically supported Ukraine’s defence sector for over a decade, providing more than $6 million annually. Remarkably, more than half of this funding has gone to support civil society. The UK’s approach has been to distinguish clearly between “military assistance” and “defence assistance.”
Military aid is focused on military-to-military cooperation at the tactical and operational levels, helping Ukrainian forces to achieve battlefield effects. By contrast, defence assistance is aimed at civilian officials who occupy managerial positions in the defence ministry and CSOs who work on governance, accountability, and strategic decision-making in the defence sector.
The UK has convincingly argued that such civilian-led initiatives fall squarely under ODA (official development assistance). After all, every civilian-led ministry, including the Ministry of Defence, is eligible to receive development assistance. This is why non-military defence assistance can — and should — be funded as ODA. Doing so would not only enhance Ukraine’s capacity to win the war, but also provide its international partners with vital knowledge on how civil society can strengthen national defence in the 21st century.
These groups have so far relied primarily on domestic crowdfunding and private donations north of hundreds of millions of dollars in the Come Back Alive and Prytula Charity Foundation cases. Showing universal support and endorsement from millions of people and businesses, which is critical when corruption sensitives are still equally high on western partners and Russian propaganda agendas. Their contribution is not only symbolic—it is measurable, strategic, and often life-saving. In many brigades, between 30% and 100% of critical supplies — such as drones, tactical medical equipment, and protective gear—are sourced from civil society organisations and volunteers. Over half of all vehicles used by Ukrainian defence forces, from pickup trucks to off-road vehicles, have been procured or repaired by these groups.
Civil society plays a vital role in smoothing the boom-and-bust cycle of foreign military assistance in times when “as long as it takes” means till the next election cycle. While state level aid is often delayed by procurement rules and bureaucratic processes, Ukrainian NGOs can deploy needed equipment or supplies within days. Their speed and responsiveness provide a lifeline between major aid tranches, helping to maintain operational continuity on the front lines.
Civil society actors such as Dignitas were among the first to recognise and promote the military potential of FPV drones for both reconnaissance and precision strikes. Initially dismissed by official structures, these "kitchen-made" drones have now become standard tools of asymmetric warfare such as the recent daring “Spiderweb” operation. Training programs like Boryviter Center of Excellence, Victory drones design blueprints, Delta situational awareness software initially developed by Civilian IT experts from Aerorozvidka and combat tactics were all pioneered by volunteers long before formal adoption by the Armed Forces.
Many of these organisations, some run and most employ veterans, serve as real-time testing grounds for new technologies, tactics, and battlefield solutions with MoD endorsement. They receive direct feedback from soldiers and rapidly iterate and adapt tools for maximum effectiveness and can work with Western partners and manufacturers on real battlefield tests. They also can partner with the international community on high-quality analysis, policy recommendations, and on-the-ground intelligence, civil society groups enhance the strategic planning capacity of overstretched government bodies. Their role as trusted advisors and institutional memory holders ensures continuity amid government turnover and rapid changes in leadership.
Despite facing a larger and better-funded adversary, Ukraine continues to fight — and win tactical and strategic ground — thanks in some part to the contribution of its civil society. It is essential that Ukraine’s allies expand their engagement beyond government-to-government cooperation and recognise the vital role of civic actors in the country’s defence ecosystem.
About the Authors:
Lesia Ogryzko is the Director of the Sahaidachnyi Security Center. She brings extensive experience from her work in international organizations, the Government of Ukraine, and civil society. She also currently works in the Reform Support Office of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Polina Istomina is a UK-Ukraine Programs Specialist at the Sahaidachnyi Security Center, where she focuses on developing strategies to deepen UK-Ukraine defence and security cooperation. She is particularly interested in how Ukraine is fighting and prevailing in one of the most technologically advanced wars, with a focus on supporting, nurturing, and mentoring military technology companies through platforms like Brave1.
Anastasiia Haievska works with policymakers and civil society actors in the UK, Ukraine, and globally, focusing on international conflict, global security, and democratic governance. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.
